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Abstract 
Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown 
to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further 
explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the 
questions of (i) asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous emergence of 
communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding 
the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test 
these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that 
although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric 
communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency 
relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote 
to endogenously open communication channels even though this leads to lower 
payoffs and efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Cheap talk can facilitate coordination on the efficient equilibrium in experimental games 
with Pareto-ranked equilibria (Cooper et al., 1992; Charness, 2000; Charness and Grosskopf, 
2004; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002, 2006; Brandts and Cooper, 2007). For example, Van Huyck et 
al. (1993) demonstrate that pre-play communication is efficiency-enhancing in coordination 
games. Blume and Ortmann (2007) find that costless nonbinding messages, even when they have 
minimal information content, can facilitate quick convergence to the Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium. Since many economic interactions can be modeled as coordination games, this 
finding may have a very important general implication: improving communication in 
coordination games can increase efficiency and social welfare. However, this broad conclusion 
can be misleading. Indeed, Cason et al. (2012) show that allowing within-group communication 
in competitive coordination games, such as rent-seeking contests, may lead to more aggressive 
competition between groups. Therefore, the introduction of within-group communication in such 
environments may actually cause inefficiency and decrease social welfare. 
This study further explores potentially harmful effects of within-group communication in 
competitive coordination games, by addressing two questions. The first question concerns with 
the effects of asymmetric communication: If only one of the two competing groups can 
communicate, does such asymmetric communication harm efficiency by increasing competition 
between groups? The second question concerns with the endogenous emergence of 
communication: Given that communication may potentially harm efficiency, do groups still 
choose to establish the “harmful” communication channel? To answer these questions, we re-
analyze some existing data from and add two new treatments to the Cason et al. (2012) 
experiment that employs a weakest-link contest between two groups. 
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The weakest-link contest combines features of a cooperative weakest-link game (Van 
Huyck et al., 1990) and a competitive rent-seeking contest (Tullock, 1980). One key 
characteristic of this type of contest is that coordination on higher efforts increases the 
probability of winning the prize, thus receiving potentially higher payoffs. Efforts are aggregated 
within each group with a weakest-link production technology, so the effective group effort 
equals the lowest effort expended by an individual in the group. The weakest-link feature of this 
contest resembles many real life competitions where the performance of the entire group depends 
on the worst performer within a group (Hirshleifer, 1983). For example, in many teamwork 
competitions each member of the team is responsible for a specific task. If any of the members 
performs his/her task poorly then the team loses the competition. Certain R&D competitions 
have such characteristics. Also, in terrorist attacks and in some military battles, the attacker's 
objective is often to successfully attack one target, rather than a subset of targets (Clark and 
Konrad, 2007; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012). 
In a group contest coordination on higher efforts increases the probability of winning the 
prize but decreases the competitor’s payoff. Therefore, higher efforts may lead to lower 
efficiency due to the negative externality imposed on the competing group. This unique feature 
of the group contest has been used by researchers to examine questions about punishment and 
retaliation (Abbink et al., 2010), rent-seeking (Ahn et al., 2011), group structure (Sheremeta, 
2011), and leadership (Eisenkopf, 2014).
1
 Previous studies have shown that when there is no 
within-group communication, group members are able to achieve a substantial level of 
coordination within each group (Sutter and Strassmair, 2009). Allowing within-group 
                                                 
1
 For a comprehensive review of these studies see Sheremeta (2015). Most contest studies find that subjects behave 
more aggressively than predicted and their behavior is heterogeneous (Sheremeta, 2013).  
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communication leads to even better coordination, but as a result of more aggressive competition 
it also leads to lower efficiency (Cason et al., 2012; Brookins et al., 2015).
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Our experiment employs a weakest-link contest to further explore the potentially harmful 
effects of within-group communication in competitive coordination games. The weakest-link 
feature gives contestants the ability to lower unilaterally their own group’s effort, thereby 
decreasing excessive effort expenditures and improving efficiency. Regarding the first question 
of asymmetric communication, we find that when only one group can communicate, the 
communicating group coordinates better and expends higher efforts than the non-communicating 
group. As a result, the communicating group earns payoffs similar to the baseline contest without 
any communication while the non-communicating group earns lower payoff. Allowing within-
group communication in both groups leads to even more aggressive competition and the lowest 
average payoffs in both groups. We use content analysis to analyze why communication is 
harmful and find that subjects often send messages expressing their desire to compete and win 
(significantly more so than messages about cooperation). Moreover, such messages are 
positively and significantly correlated with effort expenditures in the contest, which could 
partially explain overly aggressive competition in the presence of communication. 
Regarding the second question of endogenous communication, we find that groups 
routinely choose to establish communication channels. As in the exogenous case, endogenously 
selected communication enhances coordination, but it also leads to more aggressive competition 
and lower efficiency. Choosing to communicate or not resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. 
By jointly choosing to restrict within-group communication both groups can earn higher payoffs, 
but incentives are such that choosing to communicate is a weakly dominant strategy. Even 
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 Although Sutter and Strassmair (2009) also document that communication within groups increases individual 
efforts, such efforts lead to higher payoffs and higher efficiency under their design. 
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though communication is only a weakly dominant strategy, almost all groups choose to 
communicate. Such strong adoption of communication is unlikely due to only strategic reasons. 
Therefore, we provide several other explanations for this result, such as natural preferences for 
communication, non-monetary incentives, social preferences and social group identity. 
We present the theoretical model and derive the predictions in Section 2. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and procedures, while Section 4 presents the results. Finally, 
we discuss implications of our results in Section 5. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. No Communication  
Consider a contest between two groups 𝐴  and 𝐵 , each consisting of 𝑁  risk-neutral 
players. All players within each group simultaneously and independently expend irreversible and 
costly individual efforts 𝑥𝑖𝐴 and 𝑥𝑖𝐵. Players within the winning group each receive a prize 𝑣. 
Players within the losing group receive no prize. The total effective effort of each group depends 
on the lowest effort chosen by a member within the group – the so-called weakest-link. Group 
efforts determine winning probabilities using the Tullock (1980) lottery contest success function, 
so the probability of group 𝐴 (similarly group 𝐵) winning the prize is:3 
𝑝𝐴(𝑥𝑖𝐴, 𝑥−𝑖𝐴) =
min{𝑥1𝐴,…,𝑥𝑁𝐴}
min{𝑥1𝐴,…,𝑥𝑁𝐴} + min{𝑥1𝐵,…,𝑥𝑁𝐵}
     (1) 
The expected payoff for player 𝑖 in group 𝐴 (similarly group 𝐵) can be written as: 
𝜋𝑖𝐴(𝑥𝑖𝐴, 𝑥−𝑖𝐴) = 𝑝𝐴(𝑥𝑖𝐴, 𝑥−𝑖𝐴)𝑣 − 𝑥𝑖𝐴.      (2) 
The weakest-link rule for mapping individual efforts to group effort makes this a 
coordination game, with multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which the players within the 
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 Groups win with equal probability if they both have a lowest effort equal to 0. 
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same group match their efforts at the same level while best responding to the effort of the other 
group (Sheremeta, 2011; Cason et al., 2012; Lee, 2012; Brookins et al., 2015). The best-response 
functions (correspondences), defined by 𝑥𝐴 ≤ √𝑥𝐵𝑣 − 𝑥𝐵  and 𝑥𝐵 ≤ √𝑥𝐴𝑣 − 𝑥𝐴 , are shown in 
Figure 1, and the full set of pure strategy Nash equilibria are illustrated by the double-shaded 
lens intersection of the two best-response functions. Thus in a treatment without any form of 
communication (NC-NC), theory predicts that effort within each group shall be the same 
whereas across groups can vary between 0 and 𝑣/4. The Pareto efficient equilibrium outcome is 
achieved when all players from both groups exert 0 effort and share the prize with equal 
probability. The least efficient equilibrium outcome is obtained when all players from both 
groups exert 𝑣/4. This is the group Pareto dominant equilibrium because no group has an 
incentive to deviate from it. 
 
2.2. Symmetric Communication  
Next, consider a contest in which players within group 𝐴 and players within group 𝐵 can 
communicate. This corresponds to the C-C treatment in the experiment. The results in existing 
literature indicate that the communicating groups usually act cooperatively as one player (Sutter 
and Strassmair, 2009; Zhang, 2009; Cason et al, 2012).
4
 Therefore, the contest between two 
groups reduces effectively to a contest between two unitary players, with groups choosing efforts 
according to the standard Tullock best-response functions 𝑥𝐴 = √𝑥𝐵𝑣 − 𝑥𝐵 and 𝑥𝐵 = √𝑥𝐴𝑣 − 𝑥𝐴 
shown in Figure 2. Assuming that all players within each group act cooperatively results in the 
unique Nash equilibrium where all players in each group match their efforts at the same level, 
i.e., 𝑥𝑖𝐴 = 𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝑗𝐵 = 𝑥𝐵 = 𝑣/4 for all 𝑖 and 𝑗. Note that this is exactly the same as the group 
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 One of the reasons why communication is such a powerful coordination device is that it creates group identity 
(Sutter, 2009; Cason et al, 2012). Chen and Li (2009) provide an excellent literature review and important new 
results on group identity. 
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Pareto dominant equilibrium in the case with no communication. Thus, theory predicts that 
communication may harm efficiency. 
 
2.3. Asymmetric Communication  
The new treatments introduced in this paper include exogenously imposed 
communication within one group and not the other (C-NC treatment), and the endogenous choice 
by each group to either establish communication or not (Endogenous treatment). This requires an 
analysis of communication asymmetry. Therefore, consider a contest in which players within 
group 𝐴  can communicate, while players in group 𝐵  cannot. This corresponds to the C-NC 
treatment. We maintain the assumption (supported in the previous empirical literature) that the 
communicating group 𝐴 acts as one player trying to jointly choose a common effort 𝑥𝐴, while all 
players in the non-communicating group 𝐵 maximize the objective function (2). Obviously, in 
any equilibria 𝑥𝑖𝐴 = 𝑥𝐴 for all 𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗𝐵 = 𝑥𝐵 for all 𝑗. If communication resolves coordination 
problem in group 𝐴, group 𝐴 will respond to the effort of group 𝐵 according to the best-response 
function 𝑥𝐴 = √𝑥𝐵𝑣 − 𝑥𝐵 (this is exactly the same best-response function as in a standard two-
player Tullock contest). On the other hand, due to possible multiple coordination outcomes, 
players in group 𝐵 have a less precise best-response to the effort of group 𝐴, i.e. 𝑥𝐵 ≤ √𝑥𝐴𝑣 −
𝑥𝐴. The intersection of these best response functions provides the set of possible Nash equilibria 
as in Figure 3. Note that the set of Nash equilibria corresponds to the upward sloping part of the 
best response function of group 𝐴. 
Our theoretical model and resulting equilibria imply a number of testable hypotheses 
regarding the impact of asymmetric communication. The theoretical prediction for the C-NC 
treatment is that players in the non-communicating group should choose identical effort level 
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between 0 and 𝑣/4, and players within the communicating group should jointly maximize their 
payoffs in response to the behavior of the non-communicating group. As demonstrated in Figure 
3, such best-response dictates higher effort level than the non-communicating group, although 
the range of possible efforts is still between 0 and 𝑣/4. Therefore, regarding the effects of 
asymmetric communication, we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 1: In the C-NC treatment, efforts of the communicating group are no smaller 
than efforts of the non-communicating group. 
In the NC-NC treatment, all players within each group should coordinate on the same 
effort level, but this level can vary across groups between 0 and 𝑣/4. The same is true for non-
communicating group in the C-NC treatment, so we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Efforts of the non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment are similar 
to efforts of the non-communicating group in the NC-NC treatment. 
In the C-C treatment, all players within each group should choose efforts equal to the 
group Pareto dominant equilibrium of 𝑣/4, and on average we documented earlier that average 
efforts modestly exceed this level. As illustrated in Figure 3, the equilibrium prediction for the 
communicating group in the C-NC treatment lies in the range between 0 and 𝑣/4, so this group 
should expend effort no greater than the communicating group in the C-C treatment. Therefore, 
when comparing behavior in the C-NC treatment to the C-C treatment, we expect the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Efforts of the communicating group in the C-NC treatment are no greater 
than efforts of the communicating group in the C-C treatment. 
To summarize, we should observe the lowest aggregate effort in the NC-NC treatment, 
followed by the C-NC treatment, and then by the C-C treatment. Since lower efforts imply 
higher payoffs (due to the embedded contest structure), we should expect payoffs to be the 
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highest in the NC-NC treatment, followed by the C-NC treatment, and then by the C-C 
treatment. Since efficiency is directly related to payoffs, we expect the same ranking for 
efficiency. This gives our final hypotheses regarding the impact of asymmetric communication: 
Hypothesis 4: Payoffs and efficiency are the highest in the NC-NC treatment, followed 
by the C-NC treatment, and then by the C-C treatment. 
 
2.4. Endogenous Communication  
To study the effect of endogenous communication, we consider a contest in which group 
𝐴 and group 𝐵 endogenously decide whether to establish within-group communication or not 
before making effort choices. We can derive a theoretical prediction for this Endogenous 
treatment by examining two cases. First, we determine if choosing to communicate is a dominant 
strategy when the other group chooses not to communicate. For this, we need to compare the 
expected payoff of the communicating group in the C-NC treatment to the expected payoff of the 
non-communicating group in the NC-NC treatment. If we assume that the behavior of the non-
communicating group in the C-NC treatment is the same as the behavior of the non-
communicating group in the NC-NC treatment, then the payoff of the communicating group in 
the C-NC treatment should be at least as great as the payoff of the non-communicating group in 
the NC-NC treatment (this is because the communicating group always best responds to the 
effort of the non-communicating group without having to deal with coordination problem).
5
 
                                                 
5
 To make this point more clear, examine the following example. Assume that there are two 3-player groups and the 
prize value is 60 (these are the parameters that we use in our experiment). The prediction for the NC-NC treatment is 
that both non-communicating groups should coordinate by exerting efforts anywhere between 0 and 15. Also, 
assume that in the NC-NC treatment, both groups actually choose 8 as their effort (which is very close to what we 
observe in our experiment). So, each player earns 22 (i.e., 60×8/(8+8)-8=22). If the non-communicating group does 
not change its behavior in the C-NC treatment, then the communicating group can increase its payoff by best 
responding to 8 and choosing 14 (i.e., (8×60)
1/2
-8≈14). The corresponding payoff of the communicating group in the 
C-NC treatment is 24 (i.e., 60×14/(14+8)-14≈24), which is higher than the payoff of the non-communicating group 
9 
 
Therefore, choosing to communicate is a weakly dominant strategy when the other group 
chooses not to communicate. 
Second, we determine if choosing to communicate is a dominant strategy when the other 
group chooses to communicate. For this, we need to compare the expected payoff of the 
communicating group in the C-C treatment and the expected payoff of the non-communicating 
group in the C-NC treatment. The payoff of the communicating group in the C-C treatment is 
𝑣/4 . The payoff of the non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment is √𝑥𝑣 − 𝑥  (i.e., 
𝑣𝑥/(𝑥 + √𝑥𝑣 − 𝑥) − 𝑥 ), where 𝑥  is any effort between 0 and 𝑣/4  depending on the exact 
equilibrium selection. However, since 𝑣/4 ≥ √𝑥𝑣 − 𝑥 for all 𝑥, choosing to communicate is a 
weakly dominant strategy. This gives our final hypotheses regarding the endogenous selection of 
communication. 
Hypothesis 5: Groups should establish communication channels since choosing to 
communicate is a weakly dominant strategy. 
It is interesting that by jointly choosing within-group communication both groups earn 
lower payoffs than by jointly choosing to restrict within-group communication (see Hypothesis 
4). Therefore, the communication choice resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a weakly 
dominant strategy. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our principal research questions are about the impact of asymmetric and endogenous 
communication on competition between groups. To study these questions, we employed four 
treatments as summarized in Table 1: NC-NC, C-C, C-NC, and Endogenous. All treatments 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the NC-NC treatment. Therefore, if the other group chooses not to communicate, choosing to communicate is a 
dominant strategy. 
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employed 𝑁 = 3 players in each group and all players within the winning group received the 
prize of 𝑣 = 60 experimental francs. Subjects were placed into group 𝐴 or 𝐵 at the beginning of 
the first period, and they stayed in the same group for the duration of the experiment. They also 
competed against the same opposing group for all 30 periods of their experimental session. We 
chose this fixed matching protocol to allow subjects an opportunity to coordinate with each other 
on one of the many different equilibria. Also, because of the fixed matching protocol we 
obtained a sufficient number of statistically independent observations to perform reasonably 
powerful non-parametric tests.
6
 
At the beginning of each period, each subject received 60 experimental francs as an 
endowment (equivalent to $2.00). Effort choices were framed in the instructions using the 
standard labels used in voluntary contribution mechanism public good provision experiments: 
they could allocate to a “group account” or an “individual account.” The instructions informed 
subjects that by allocating 1 franc to their individual account they would earn 1 franc, while by 
allocating 1 franc to their group account they could increase the chance of their group receiving 
the reward. Subjects could contribute any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. 
The baseline treatment NC-NC implements a contest without communication. In 
treatments with communication, before subjects made their allocation decisions they had an 
opportunity to communicate with other participants via chat windows. In the C-NC treatment, 
subjects in one group could send messages to the two other members of their own group 
anonymously via this chat window for 60 seconds each period. In the C-C treatment, separate 
chat windows were enabled for both groups. For all chat communications we asked subjects to 
                                                 
6
 Subjects were informed that the session would last for exactly 30 periods, so the stage equilibrium prediction also 
holds for this finitely repeated game. As noted above, we conjectured that groups or individuals might coordinate on 
Pareto-improving outcomes in the repeated game, since this is frequently observed in the experimental literature 
even in finitely-repeated games with a unique equilibrium (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986).  
11 
 
follow two basic rules: (i) to be civil to one another and not to use profanity, and (ii) not to 
identify themselves in any manner. Messages were recorded. After the chat period was over, all 
subjects simultaneously made their effort (allocation) decisions, and then a random draw 
determined the winning group. A simple lottery was used to explain how the computer chose the 
winning group.
7
 At the end of each period subjects were informed of group 𝐴’s and 𝐵’s effective 
efforts (i.e., the minimum effort in each group). 
Note, in the above three treatments, we exogenously vary the communication channel to 
measure the causal effect of symmetric and asymmetric communication in the competitive 
coordination game. To further explore whether these effects persist when groups can 
endogenously choose to enable or disable communication, we implement an endogenous 
communication treatment as follows. All subjects began with 10 periods of the NC-NC treatment 
to become familiar with the strategic properties of the game. Then three players in each group 
voted (before period 11 and before period 21) whether to establish communication for 10 
periods.
8
 Unanimity was required to establish communication channel. After the voting stage, the 
computer revealed whether each group elected to communicate during the competition stage. 
Therefore, effectively groups could endogenously choose to participate in the NC-NC, C-C, or 
C-NC treatment.
9
 We considered alternative ways of implementing endogenous communication, 
                                                 
7
 Probabilities were explained in the instructions as a number of tokens placed in a bingo cage based on effort 
choices, and then one token draw determined the winning individual or group. 
8
 Another option was to allow subjects to vote every round to decide whether they want to communicate or not. 
However, it would substantially delay the experiment (by about an hour) and it would also create incentives for 
subjects to avoid lengthy communications. Another concern is that after subjects choose to communicate after 
period 10 (i.e., they end up in the C-NC or C-C treatment), they can devise a future strategy in case when such 
communication is not available. However, reading through chats we did not find this to be the case. 
9
 As we expect that people have a natural tendency to communicate, we adopted a very strict voting rule – groups 
must reach a unanimous decision in a single vote to open the communication channel to increase the occurrence of 
the endogenous C-NC treatment. It turned out that among the 72 subjects, only 7 subjects voted against 
communication in the first voting round and they belonged to 7 different groups. Thus if we had used a majority 
rule, we would only observe the endogenous C-C treatment. The second vote before period 21 gives groups another 
chance to decide whether they want to communicate. It could provide perhaps the clearest evidence of the 
desirability of communication if groups switched from communication to no-communication. 
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such as including explicit costs of opening chat rooms or more frequent votes to open or close 
communication opportunities. We chose this 10-period time frame for stationary communication 
subgames to strengthen the importance of the communication votes and to reduce potential 
spillovers across periods arising from group planning in communication periods for strategies in 
non-communication periods (Isaac and Walker, 1991). 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. A total of 216 subjects participated in 18 sessions. Subjects were Purdue University 
undergraduate students who participated in only one session of this study. Some students had 
participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research. Data from the 
96 subjects in the NC-NC and C-C treatments were previously reported in Cason et al. (2012) as 
the “NOCOMM” and “INTRA” treatments. Results from the additional 120 subjects in the 
asymmetric and endogenous communication treatments are newly reported in this study. 
The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At 
the beginning of each session subjects were given the written instructions, shown in Appendix, 
and the experimenter also read the instructions aloud. At the end of the session, 5 out of 30 
randomly-drawn periods were selected for payment. Earnings were converted from experimental 
francs into US dollars at a preannounced exchange rate. Subjects earned about $21 on average 
and sessions lasted about 60 to 90 minutes.  
 
4. Experimental Results 
4.1. Exogenous Communication 
The first part of Table 2 summarizes the average group effective (minimum) effort, 
individual effort, wasted effort, and expected payoffs (based on effort choices, before the lottery 
13 
 
draw) in the three exogenous treatments. Figure 4 displays the effective group effort over time by 
treatment. In the NC-NC treatment, average individual effort should be between 0 and 15. The 
actual average effort is 11.18, indicating that subjects learn to coordinate their efforts on 
substantial level. When within-group communication is allowed in both groups, as in the C-C 
treatment, the average individual effort is 20.13. Both the average and minimum (group 
effective) efforts are significantly higher in the C-C treatment than in the NC-NC treatment 
(Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.05, n=m=8).
10
 Also, we find that the amount of wasted effort is 
significantly lower in the C-C treatment than in the NC-NC treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-
value<0.05; n=m=8).
11
 Most importantly, because of the greater efforts in the C-C treatment, the 
expected payoff in the C-C treatment is significantly lower than the payoff in the NC-NC 
treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.05, n=m=8). These results have been previously 
reported in Cason et al. (2012) and they serve as a baseline for examining how asymmetric 
communication impacts behavior in competitive coordination games. 
In the novel C-NC treatment, within-group communication was allowed only in one 
group. Our hypothesis is that because of communication efforts of the communicating group 
should be no lower than efforts of the non-communicating group. Table 2 shows that in the 
communicating group the actual average individual effort is 13.99 and the average group 
effective (minimum) effort is 13.56. In the non-communicating group the average individual 
effort is 11.30 and effective effort is 8.85. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both effort measures are 
significantly different between the communicating and non-communicating groups (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p-value=0.02, n=8). Also, relative to the non-communicating group, the 
                                                 
10
 All non-parametric tests employ only the independent observations of six subjects. Similar results hold when 
considering only the later 20 periods. 
11
 Wasted effort is calculated by taking the average of the differences between individual effort and the group 
minimum effort within each group (Riechmann and Weimann, 2008). Complete coordination is reached when 
wasted effort equals zero. 
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communicating group in the C-NC treatment achieves significantly better coordination (the mean 
wasted effort is 0.43 versus 2.45; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value<0.01, n=8).
12
 The 
communicating group attributed their superior ability to coordinate and make higher efforts to 
their chats. In their own words, “i bet we'd be dumb like them if we couldn't talk”; “we r 
dominating. still do 5 cuz they're not changing”; “team work is good”. 
Result 1: In the C-NC treatment, the communicating group expends higher effort and 
achieves better coordination than the non-communicating group. 
Comparing treatments NC-NC and C-NC, the non-communicating groups in both 
treatments behave very similarly. In particular, in the NC-NC treatment, the average individual 
effort is 11.18, the minimum effort is 8.29, and the wasted effort is 2.89. Similarly, in the C-NC 
treatment, the average individual effort of the non-communicating group is 11.30, the minimum 
effort is 8.85, and the wasted effort is 2.45. For each of these measures, the differences are not 
significant between the two treatments, providing support for Hypothesis 2. 
Result 2: The non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment expends similar effort 
and achieves similar coordination than the non-communicating group in the NC-NC treatment. 
Comparing treatments C-NC and C-C, the communicating group in the C-NC treatment 
expends significantly lower effective effort than the communicating group in the C-C treatment 
(13.56 versus 18.86; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.02, n=m=8). This finding is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, we also find that the communicating group in the C-NC treatment 
achieves better coordination than the communicating group in the C-C treatment (the mean 
wasted effort is 0.43 versus 1.27; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.01, n=m=8). 
Result 3: The communicating group in the C-NC treatment expends lower effort and 
achieves better coordination than the communicating group in the C-C treatment. 
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 As with other results summarized here, conclusions are unchanged if only later periods are analyzed. 
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Our next hypothesis concerns how asymmetric communication impacts payoffs. Previous 
studies have shown that allowing within-group communication leads to better coordination, but 
as a result it can also lead to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency (Cason et al., 
2012). Our hypothesis, based on theoretical analysis, is that asymmetric communication should 
have a less dramatic impact on payoffs and efficiency. This is because the non-communicating 
group cannot compete more aggressively due to the lack of a communication channel. We have 
previously documented that the expected payoff in the NC-NC treatment is significantly higher 
than the payoff in the C-C treatment (18.82 versus 9.87; Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.05, 
n=m=8). When examining the impact of asymmetric communication relative to symmetric 
communication, we find that the payoff of the communicating group in the C-NC treatment is 
significantly higher than the payoff in the C-C treatment (22.71 versus 9.87; Mann-Whitney test, 
p-value<0.05, n=m=8), while the payoff of the non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment 
is not significantly different from the payoff in the C-C treatment (12.01 versus 9.87; Mann-
Whitney test, p-value=0.60, n=m=8). This suggests that, consistent with Hypothesis 4, the 
asymmetric communication has a less dramatic impact on payoffs and efficiency. When 
examining the impact of asymmetric communication relative to no communication, we find that 
the payoff of the communicating group in the C-NC treatment is not significantly different from 
the payoff in the NC-NC treatment (22.71 versus 18.82; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.34, 
n=m=8), while the payoff of the non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment is 
significantly lower than the payoff in the NC-NC treatment (12.01 versus 18.82; Mann-Whitney 
test, p-value<0.05, n=m=8). In general, our results are consistent with Hypothesis 4. 
Result 4: The communicating group in the C-NC treatment earns higher payoffs than the 
communicating group in the C-C treatment and similar payoffs to the non-communicating group 
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in the NC-NC treatment. The non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment earns similar 
payoffs to the communicating group in the C-C treatment and lower payoffs than the non-
communicating groups in the NC-NC treatment. 
To summarize, within-group communication causes groups to compete more 
aggressively. When only one group can communicate, the communicating group coordinates 
better and expends higher efforts than the non-communicating group. However, the 
communicating group earns payoffs that are similar to the baseline contest without 
communication, while the non-communicating group earns lower payoffs than in the baseline, 
non-communication contest. Allowing within-group communication in both groups leads to even 
more aggressive competition and the lowest payoffs to both groups. Therefore, it appears that 
although asymmetric within-group communication is not as harmful as symmetric 
communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case 
when no groups can communicate. 
 
4.2. Endogenous Communication 
Given that communication harms efficiency, do groups still choose to establish the 
“harmful” communication channel? To answer this question, we examine behavior of 24 groups 
in the Endogenous treatment. Table 3 summarizes the endogenous communication choices by 
periods. In periods 1-10 all 24 groups were assigned exogenously to the NC-NC treatment and 
were not allowed to communicate. Before period 11, members of each group voted whether to 
open the communication channel for periods 11-20. Overall, 65 out of 72 participants voted to 
open the channel of communication within their groups, resulting in 17 out of 24 groups having 
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the ability to communicate during periods 11-20.
13
 Consequently, 2 groups participated in the 
NC-NC treatment, 12 groups in the C-C treatment and 10 groups in the C-CN treatment. Before 
period 21, members of each group voted again to open the communication channel for periods 
21-30. This time, 68 out of 72 participants voted to communicate within their groups, resulting in 
20 out of 24 groups having the ability to communicate during periods 21-30.
14
 Consequently, no 
groups participated in the NC-NC treatment, 16 groups in the C-C treatment and 4 groups in the 
C-CN treatment.
15
 Therefore, it appears that the vast majority of participants, and consequently 
groups, endogenously choose to have continued access to communication. This result is 
consistent with our final Hypothesis 5. 
Result 5: The vast majority of groups endogenously and consistently choose to have 
access to communication. 
Do groups that choose to communicate endogenously behave differently than groups that 
are allowed to communicate exogenously? Figure 5 visually shows the comparison between 
behavior in the Endogenous and exogenous communication treatments.
16
 For average effort, no 
significant differences exist between NC-NC and en_NC-NC (8.2 versus 8.4; Mann-Whitney test, 
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 Looking at the data from periods 1-10, we did not find any significant difference in group effort, wasted effort and 
payoffs between the 7 groups that voted against communication and the 17 groups that voted for communication. 
Given that communication is costless and groups have not yet experienced the potential harmful effect of 
communication, it is puzzling why these 7 subjects chose not to communicate.  
14
 Three out of 7 subjects who voted against communication in the first vote continued choosing not to communicate 
in the second vote. The 4 groups that switched to communication in second vote all earned less than their opponent 
groups during periods 11-20.  
15
 Only 1 of the 17 groups who communicated in periods 11-20 chose not to communicate in periods 21-30. This 
group faced very aggressive competition from the opponent group after communication was enabled and raised 
average effort from about 9 tokens in the first 10 periods to an average of 27.8 (compared to 22.3 by their opponent) 
in the second 10 periods. Although their average effort was higher than the opponent group, they only won 40% of 
the time. In this group, members expressed frustration via chat in period 19 [session 120827_1512, group 2]: “ID6: 
sad....” “ID 5: we have lost the last 3”; “ID 4: yeah they have had better odds luck”. In period 20, ID 5 put in 0 
tokens deviating from the proposal of “ok do 34 again”. Perhaps as a result of this deviation, ID 6 voted against 
communication in period 21. Their opponent group who continued to communicate commented in period 21: “they 
don’t communicate lol” “I know” “lol” “stupids” “and put 0 lol” “lets keep this going” “they lose the advantage”.  
16
 Recall, in the Endogenous treatment, groups were not allowed to vote to open the communication channel until 
period 11. There was only one pair of groups each endogenously chose not to communicate in periods 11-20 and no 
pair in periods 21-30. We report the data from periods 1-10 for the NC-NC outcome in endogenous treatment (the 
first blue bar in the figure). All other comparisons use data from periods 11-30. 
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p-value=0.97, n=8, m=12), between C-C and en_C-C (18.9 versus 20.3; Mann-Whitney test, p-
value=0.34, n=8, m=9), between non-communicating groups in C-NC and en_C-NC (8.9 versus 
11.1; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.35, n=8, m=7), and between communicating groups in C-
NC and en_C-NC (14.1 versus 13.3; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.73, n=8, m=7). Thus, it 
appears that what matters is the type of the communication channel, not whether the specific 
channel is created exogenously or endogenously. Groups that endogenously choose to 
communicate expend similar efforts than groups that are allowed to communicate exogenously. 
Similarly, we find no statistical differences between the average wasted effort in the 
Endogenous treatment and exogenous treatments (all p-values are greater than 0.10).
17
 The same 
is true when comparing the average payoffs (all p-values are greater than 0.10).  
Result 6: Groups that endogenously choose to communicate expend similar efforts, 
achieve similar coordination and earn similar payoffs than groups that are allowed to 
communicate exogenously. 
Note that as with exogenous communication, endogenously chosen within-group 
communication makes groups compete more aggressively. The competition level is moderate 
and payoffs are the highest when no group chooses to communicate. When only one group 
chooses to communicate, the competition level increases and payoffs decrease for the non-
communicating group. Finally, when both groups choose to communicate this leads to the most 
aggressive competition and the lowest payoffs to both groups. 
To further explore the effects of communication and find out why communication is 
harmful, we analyze how subjects utilize communication and use content analysis to examine 
what kinds of messages are associated with more competitive behavior. 
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 The only exception is the comparison between communicating groups in C-NC and en_C-NC (0.3 versus 1.3; 
Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.07, n=8, m=7).  
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4.3. Analysis of Communication Content 
The analysis of communication content is challenging because the qualitative information 
exchanged in chats is difficult to quantify objectively. The procedure that we used is becoming 
standard in the emerging experimental economics literature that explicitly analyzes how chat 
communication affects behavior. First, we randomly selected a session to develop a coding 
scheme. A careful analysis of messages in that session resulted in 16 independent categories 
shown in Table 4. Then we employed two individuals to code independently all chat room 
discussions into the coding categories. The unit of observation for coding was all messages in a 
given period within each chat room. If that chat room was deemed to contain the relevant 
category of content for that period it was coded as 1 for that category and 0 otherwise. Each unit 
was coded under as many or few categories as the coders deemed appropriate. The coders were 
not informed about any hypotheses of the study, although they read the experiment instructions 
provided to subjects so that they understood the strategic environment the subjects faced. 
Coding is subjective so the coders do not always agree on the message classification. To 
assess whether a particular type of message meaning is reliably coded, we follow Henning-
Schmidt et al. (2008) and Cooper and Kühn (2014) in using a standard approach from content 
analysis methodology to adjust the reliability statistic to account for the number of categories 
that coders can use for classification. Agreement between the coders can occur by chance, 
especially if there are few categories for classification or that type of content is very frequently 
or infrequently observed. Cohen’s Kappa (Krippendorff, 2004; Cohen, 1960) is a scaled measure 
of agreement that takes a value of 0 when the agreement is consistent with random chance and 1 
when the coders agree perfectly. Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 are considered “Moderate” 
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agreement, and those above 0.60 indicate “Substantial” agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977). 
Most of our message categories were coded at the “Moderate” or “Substantial” agreement. Some 
categories that were classified below the threshold of 0.4, as indicated by italic in Table 4, were 
excluded from analysis. 
Table 4 displays the average frequency that the coders classified chat room discussions in 
specific categories. In all treatments, the most common category coded is “agreement reached 
within group” (category C2a), suggesting that 76%-92% of time group members coordinate by 
reaching agreement. Also, a considerable fraction of coded chat rooms (30%-40%) include 
discussions about using the same strategy over time, i.e., subjects want to “stick with the same 
strategy” (category C2g). The fact that subjects often reach agreement and coordinate on a 
specific strategy is consistent with Results 1 and 3, which document that within-group 
communication improves coordination.  
Another category that is frequently coded (17%-38%) is about competition – subjects use 
messages to encourage competition and to evoke a desire to win the contest, i.e., “try to 
win/compete by raising effort” (category C2d). Finally, it appears from chat messages that 
subjects use Cournot belief updating (20%-38%), i.e., they “look back one period” (category 
C1a), and they take into account the behavior of other group members (16%-38%), i.e., they 
“make choices by reasoning from the other group's point of view” (category C1c). These 
observations suggest that when examining how communication impacts effort in contests, it is 
important to control for learning, Cournot updating, and behavior of the opponents. 
Table 5 reports estimation results of random effects models of individual effort choices 
(Effortt) on previous period effort chosen by the competing group (Othergroup-effortt-1) and the 
previous period effort squared (Othergroup-effortt-1^2), to account for the inverted U-shaped best 
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response reaction function illustrated in Figures 1-3. These models also control for the risk 
attitudes inferred from the separate lottery choice task (Risk), the effective effort chosen by that 
group in the previous period (Group-effortt-1) and a nonlinear time trend (1/period).
18
 Finally, all 
regressions are augmented with the reliably-coded categories of communication from Table 4. 
The estimate on Group-effortt-1 is positive and significant in all treatments and data 
subsets, suggesting that individuals learn to coordinate their individual effort to match their 
group effort. The estimate on Messages is positive and significant in the Endogenous treatment 
(columns 3 and 4), indicating that the more messages subjects send in the Endogenous treatment 
the more aggressive is their effort expenditure. In some treatments the estimates on categories 
C1a, C1b, and C1c are significant, suggesting that subjects are learning to best respond to the 
actions of others. In almost all cases the estimates on categories C2c and C2d are significant but 
with opposite signs. This is intuitive: the more subjects send messages about cooperation 
(category C2c) the lower is their effort and the more subjects send messages expressing their 
desire to compete and win (category C2d) the higher is their effort. Table 4 shows that there are 
almost twice as many messages about competition and winning (category C2c) than about 
cooperation (category C2d). The fact that subjects spend so many messages emphasizing 
competition and winning may help explaining why communication makes groups compete more 
aggressively. Finally, note that verbal bullying or punishment (category C4a) is associated with 
much greater effort. This suggests that these types of statements, while used infrequently, can 
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 Before the subjects played 30 periods of the stage game, we elicited subjects’ risk attitudes using multiple price 
list of 15 simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002). Specifically, subjects were asked to state whether they 
preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a 
payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered 
a 0% chance of winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning $0, while the last lottery offered a 70% chance of 
winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. At the end of the session, one of the 15 lottery decisions was randomly 
selected for payment. Overall, 74% of the subjects are risk averse in both the exogenous and endogenous treatments. 
Theoretically it is not clear how risk aversion may impact individual behavior in our game. However, most studies 
find that in simple lottery contests more risk-averse subjects choose lower efforts than less risk-averse subjects 
(Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Shupp et al., 2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015).  
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restore higher efforts and promote the aggressive competition seen in the presence of 
communication. 
  
5. Discussion 
Recent research has shown that allowing within-group communication in competitive 
coordination games, such as rent-seeking contests, may lead to more aggressive competition 
between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of 
communication in competitive coordination games, by addressing the questions of (i) 
asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our 
theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on 
competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. 
The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric 
communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case 
when neither group can communicate. We use content analysis to analyze why communication is 
harmful and find that subjects often send messages expressing their desire to compete and win. 
Moreover, such messages are positively and significantly correlated with effort expenditures in 
the contest. These types of communication patterns can help explain overly aggressive 
competition in the presence of communication. The experiment also reveals that despite the 
“harmful” effect of communication, groups endogenously and consistently choose to 
communicate even though this leads to lower payoffs and efficiency. 
The results of our experiment indicate that both groups can increase their payoffs by 
restricting within-group communication. However, the question is why groups, instead of 
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restricting their communication channel, choose to communicate, thus aggravating competition, 
lower payoffs and lowering efficiency?  
One possible explanation is that groups simply behave strategically. Choosing to 
communicate or not resembles a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a weakly dominant strategy. 
However, there are many experimental studies, such as studies of the second-price sealed bid 
auction, showing that the weakly dominant strategy is not a good predictor of individual 
behavior (Camerer, 2003). Given that we find almost unanimous choice of a weakly dominant 
strategy to communicate, we believe that besides purely strategic reasons, there are other reasons 
for such strong adoption of communication in our experiment. 
First, it is possible that the desire to communicate is hard-wired into people. Researchers 
in communication studies identify several reasons why people communicate: people 
communicate to engage and persuade others, to seek and provide information, and to express 
emotions like frustration, joy, or disappointment. Especially when people face tasks that involve 
conflicts and competition, communication is one of the most sought-after ways to settle conflict 
(Cragan and Wright, 1990). In our experiment, in the vast majority of cases all three group 
members are engaged in communication by sending messages and on average each subject sends 
about 2-3 message lines in a given communication period. Communication is used effectively to 
coordinate own member’s efforts to compete against the opponent group. Moreover, subjects 
mainly express positive attitude regarding the opportunity to communicate (see Table 4).  
Second, it is possible that subjects’ objectives are not only monetary. Sheremeta (2010) 
finds that subjects are willing to incur monetary costs to be announced as winners.
19
 Others find 
that status may be important (Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011; Charness et al., 2014). Similarly, 
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 This finding has been replicated by Price and Sheremeta (2011, 2015), Brookins and Ryvkin (2014) and Mago et 
al. (2015). 
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we find that subjects frequently talk about winning and such messages lead to more aggressive 
competition. In some cases the chat messages indicate that subjects are willing to forgo payoffs 
for the joy of winning: “we might earn 10 francs less, but we can increase chances of winning”. 
Therefore, if winning is a component of individual utility, then subjects, who may even be 
perfectly aware of harmful effects of communication, may still choose to communicate in order 
to increase their utility of winning.
20
 
Third, related to the non-monetary incentives argument is the idea that instead of 
maximizing individual payoff, a subject may want to maximize his/her payoff relative to the 
opponent’s payoff (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Indeed, some studies provide evidence for such 
behavior in contests (Mago et al., 2015; Sheremeta, 2015). Therefore, choosing to communicate 
can be a strictly dominant strategy, since communicating group in the C-NC treatment receives 
higher payoff than the non-communicating group. 
Finally, it is possible that communication increases saliency of group identity (Chen and 
Li, 2009; Sutter, 2009), and subjects may prefer to communicate in order to strengthen their 
group identity. Messages that highlight collective group goals and common group identity, 
strengthen group-based norms and manipulate the perceptions of the in-group and out-group are 
often observed in our experiment (e.g., “don’t be selfish” “our group rocks”; “wow group b is 
stupid”; “.it was good working with you guys”). 
This experiment implemented the classical Tullock model of rent-seeking, which has 
been widely used to model incentives for competing interest groups to influence public policy. 
While more confident conclusions await further research, we can note preliminary implications 
of our results for this setting. In particular, our findings indicate that both symmetric and 
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 Indeed, we find that in the C-NC treatment, the communicating group wins significantly more often than the non-
communicating group. 
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asymmetric within-group communication results in greater wasteful rent-seeking. Drawing on 
results from Sutter and Strassmair (2009) and Sheremeta (2011), we conjecture that other 
mechanisms to aggregate individual efforts into group contests would also result in increased 
efforts when groups can communicate. Our general conjecture is that in group rent-seeking 
contests, similar to the one studied in this paper, mechanisms such as communication that lead to 
better within-group coordination will reduce efficiency. 
Future research can investigate how robust our findings are when the best-shot or 
summation (perfect-substitutes) technology is used within groups instead of the weakest-link 
effort aggregation rule (Abbink et al., 2010; Sheremeta, 2011; Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori, 2012; 
Chowdhury et al., 2013). Also, it would be interesting to see whether imposing a small 
communication cost in our experiment could prevent groups from talking too much and increase 
efficiency in the competitive coordination game.
21
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 There are several papers exploring the effect of costly endogenous communication on coordination (Andersson 
and Holm, 2010, 2013; Kriss et al. 2014). The main message from this small strand of literature is that efficient 
coordination is reduced because people choose to communicate too little even when the communication costs are 
small relative to the communication gain. 
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Figure 1: Nash equilibria when neither group A nor group B can communicate (NC-NC) 
  
 
Figure 2: Nash equilibrium when both group A and group B can communicate (C-C) 
 
 
Figure 3: Nash equilibria when only group A can communicate (C-NC) 
  
30 
 
Figure 4: Effective group effort over time by treatment 
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Figure 5: Comparing behavior in the Endogenous treatment to the Exogenous treatment  
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Table 1: Experimental design of treatments 
 
Treatment Independent Groups and Subjects 
NC-NC 8 Group pairs and 48 Subjects 
C-C 8 Group pairs and 48 Subjects 
C-NC 8 Group pairs and 48 Subjects 
Endogenous 12 Group pairs and 72 Subjects 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics by treatment (all periods) 
 
 Average 
Treatment 
Group Effective 
Effort 
Individual 
Effort 
Wasted 
 Effort 
Expected 
Payoff 
Exogenous Communication     
NC-NC 8.29 11.18 2.89 18.82 
 
(0.12) (0.20) (0.16) (0.29) 
C-C 18.86 20.13 1.27 9.87 
 
(0.30) (0.31) (0.14) (0.37) 
C-NC  8.85 11.30 2.45 12.01 
(non-communicating group) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17) (0.35) 
C-NC  13.56 13.99 0.43 22.71 
(communicating group) (0.23) (0.23) (0.07) (0.38) 
Endogenous Communication     
en_NC-NC 8.17 13.50 5.33 16.40 
 (0.19) (0.39) (0.35) (0.60) 
en_C-C 20.29 20.98 0.70 8.87 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.12) (0.43) 
en_C-NC 11.08 15.71 4.64 11.66 
(non-communicating group) (0.30) (0.62) (0.55) (0.76) 
en_C-NC  13.29 14.63 1.34 17.99 
(communicating group) (0.31) (0.41) (0.25) (0.48) 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Choice of endogenous communication by periods 
 
Group ID Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30 
 (Exogenous) Endogenous Choice 
5(A,B), 6(A,B), 9(A,B), 10(A,B), 12(A,B) NC-NC C-C C-C 
1(A,B), 8(A,B), 11(A,B) NC-NC C-NC C-C 
2(A,B), 7(A,B) NC-NC C-NC C-NC 
3(A,B) NC-NC C-C C-NC 
4(A,B) NC-NC NC-NC C-NC 
33 
 
Table 4: Categories for coding messages and observed frequency in chat rooms 
 
  Relative Frequency of Coding 
  Exogenous Communication Endogenous Communication 
Category Description 
C-C 
(Obs 472) 
Kappa 
C-NC 
(Obs 238) 
Kappa 
C-C 
(Obs 280) 
Kappa 
C-NC 
(Obs 89) 
Kappa 
C1 Learning and best response         
C1a Look back one period 0.20 0.66 0.20 0.43 0.30 0.47 0.38 0.38 
C1b Look back at all or some (multiple) past periods, 
not just last period 
0.10 0.42 0.12 0.42 0.12 0.59 0.10 0.75 
C1c Make choices by reasoning from the other group's 
point of view 
0.26 0.70 0.16 0.52 0.38 0.73 0.19 0.56 
C2 Communication within group         
C2a Agreement reached within group 0.82 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.92 0.57 0.84 0.69 
C2b No agreement reached within group 0.06 0.52 0.07 0.34 0.05 0.49 0.06 0.32 
C2c Try not to compete/cooperate by lowering effort 0.23 0.67 0.16 0.59 0.19 0.80 0.13 0.85 
C2d Try to win/compete by raising effort 0.33 0.55 0.17 0.85 0.38 0.73 0.31 0.74 
C2e Try to match with the opponent group effort from 
last period 
0.04 0.27 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.31 0.03 0.66 
C2f Try to win/compete by being unpredictable 0.03 0.21 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.14 0.01 -0.01 
C2g Stick with the same strategy 0.37 0.82 0.40 0.82 0.30 0.79 0.32 0.80 
C2h Cooperate until the other group defects or until the 
last period to defect 
0.00 N/A 0.03 0.41 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
C2i Luck 0.10 0.51 0.08 0.60 0.09 0.65 0.11 0.59 
C3 Opportunity to communicate         
C3a Positive attitude 0.00 N/A 0.02 0.53 0.01 0.86 0.06 0.90 
C3b Negative attitude 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.01 0.66 0.01 1.00 
C4 Other         
C4a Verbal bullying or punishment 0.03 0.63 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.86 0.01 1.00 
C4b Nothing relevant or fits 0.05 0.56 0.16 0.78 0.00 N/A 0.03 1.00 
Entries in italic indicate codes that did not reach the 0.4 Cohen’s kappa reliability threshold. 
 
 
Table 5: Effects of communication on individual effort choices (last 20 periods) 
 
Dependent variable, Effortt 
Treatment and Data Subset 
C-C C-NC en_C-C en_C-NC 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Othergroup-effortt-1 -0.08 0.21 0.16 0.63 
  [effective effort of other in t-1] (0.062) (0.137) (0.093) (0.502) 
Othergroup-effortt-1^2 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 
  [squared effective effort of other in t-1] (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.018) 
Risk 0.05 0.01 0.16 -0.37 
  [number of risky options B] (0.136) (0.078) (0.119) (0.323) 
Group-effortt-1 0.67** 0.80** 0.61** 0.45** 
  [effective group effort in t-1] (0.051) (0.053) (0.034) (0.105) 
1/period -30.94* -14.26 -44.19* -1.64 
  [inverse of period number t] (12.407) (10.070) (19.216) (17.200) 
Constant 9.36** 1.82** 6.75** 4.97 
 (1.968) (0.690) (2.617) (3.483) 
Messages -0.25 0.09 1.13** 0.87** 
  [average # of interruption per subject in chat] (0.276) (0.232) (0.224) (0.155) 
C1a 0.49 0.08 -1.76* -0.30 
  [look back one period] (0.800) (0.542) (0.832) (0.225) 
C1b -0.61 1.17** -0.95 -1.00 
  [look back at all or some (multiple) periods] (0.709) (0.359) (0.853) (0.613) 
C1c -0.79 -2.33** -1.22** -0.94 
  [make choices reasoning from other's view] (0.614) (0.569) (0.467) (1.061) 
C2a 1.75 0.57 -3.60 0.28 
  [agreement reached within group] (1.378) (1.152) (2.197) (1.319) 
C2b -3.17 
 
-5.47 
   [no agreement reached within group] (1.789) 
 
(3.019) 
 C2c -10.53** -4.60** -11.42** -1.98 
  [try not to compete/cooperate by lowering effort] (1.226) (1.128) (1.264) (1.562) 
C2d 5.66** 5.13** 10.84** 0.29 
  [try to win/compete by raising effort] (0.986) (0.782) (1.098) (0.976) 
C2e 
   
0.25 
  [try to match with the opponent group effort] 
   
(1.300) 
C2g -2.87** 0.40 1.66 0.26 
  [stick with the same strategy] (0.617) (1.095) (0.929) (0.922) 
C2h 
 
-1.66 
    [cooperate until the other group defects or the last period] 
 
(0.979) 
  C2i 0.94 -1.20* -0.75 0.41 
  [luck] (1.065) (0.583) (0.580) (0.585) 
C3a 
 
0.32 7.40** -1.50** 
  [positive statements about being able to communicate] 
 
(0.822) (1.276) (0.538) 
C3b 
  
-4.98** -0.07 
  [negative statements about being able to communicate] 
  
(0.678) (1.318) 
C4a 15.27** 
 
16.46** 5.63** 
  [verbal bullying or punishment] (1.832) 
 
(1.674) (1.151) 
Observations 936 474 786 249 
Number of Subjects 48 24 54 21 
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Standard errors robust to general heteroscedasticity are shown in parentheses. 
All models include a random effects error structure, with individual subject effects. 
Appendix (Not for Publication) – Experiment Instructions 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in two parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is 
U.S. Dollars. The currency used in Part 2 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a 
rate of _25_ francs to _1_ dollar. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 12 
participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
YOUR DECISION 
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not 
designed to test you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what 
you really would choose. 
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that 
there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. You ignore which 
line will be paid when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. 
After you have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens 
numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is going to be paid. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, 
you will receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings 
in the case you chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo 
cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in 
the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number 
shows up in the right column you earn $0. 
Decis
ion 
no. 
Option 
A 
Option 
B 
Please  
choose  
A or B 
1 $1 $3 never $0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
2 $1 $3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage $0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
3 $1 $3 if 1 or 2 $0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
4 $1 $3 if 1,2,3 $0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
5 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4, $0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 6 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5 $0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
7 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6 $0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
8 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 $0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
9 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 $0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
10 $1 $3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
 11 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 $0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $1 $3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 $0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
 INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
YOUR DECISION 
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the beginning of the first 
period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 3 people: group A or group B. You will 
remain in the same group for all 30 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of the first period, your group will 
be paired with another group. This pairing remains the same for all 30 periods of the experiment. Either group A or 
group B will receive a reward. The reward is 60 francs to each group member.  
Each period you will be given an endowment of 60 francs and asked to decide how much to allocate to the 
group account or the individual account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An 
example of your decision screen is shown below. 
 
 
 
COMMUNICATION    
In some periods before they are asked to make the allocation decision, participants may have an 
opportunity to communicate with the other two participants in their own group. This communication will consist of 
messages exchanged in a “chat area” shown on their computer screen. Any messages sent in this chat will only be 
viewed by you and the other two members in your group. The chat time will be active for 60 seconds each period 
that this communication opportunity is available. In periods that the communication opportunity is not available, 
there will be a 60 second break each period before the allocation decision. 
Although we will record the messages you send to each other, your chat id remains anonymous. The first 
person to send a message in a period will always be referred to as “member 1”, the second as “member 2” and so on. 
In sending messages, you should follow two basic rules: (1) be civil to one another and do not use profanities, and 
(2) do not identify yourself in any manner. The communication channel is intended to discuss your allocation 
choices and should be used that way.  
After the chat period is over, all group members then make their actual decisions simultaneously; you do 
not learn the actual allocation decisions of your group members until after you make your decision. 
In decision-making periods 1-10 there will be no opportunity for communication. Before period 11 you and 
the other two participants in your group will vote to determine whether to communicate each period before making 
an allocation in periods 11-20. Only if all three participants unanimously vote to communicate will the chat room be 
created for communication. Before period 21 another vote will determine whether you and your group communicate 
Your Group 
 each period before making an allocation in periods 21-30. Again, communication will occur only if all three 
participants unanimously vote to communicate.  
Both groups will vote before periods 11 and 21, so in some cases both groups A and B might communicate, 
in other cases neither group A nor B communicate, and in other cases only one of the two groups will communicate. 
Your decision screen where you make your allocation will always indicate which (if any) of the two groups 
communicated that period. 
 
YOUR EARNINGS 
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings 
will be converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is one of the five periods that is 
randomly chosen for payment. 
1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from your individual account and the earnings from 
your group account. 
2) For each franc in your individual account, you will earn 1 franc in return. So, if you keep all 60 francs that 
you are endowed with to your individual account you will earn 60 francs. But you can also earn some 
francs from your group account. 
3) By contributing to the group account you may increase the chance of receiving the reward for your group. 
In determining which group receives the reward, the computer will consider only the lowest contribution 
in group A’s account and the lowest contribution in group B’s account. If the lowest contribution in 
group A’s account exceeds the lowest contribution in group B’s account, group A has higher chance of 
receiving the reward and vise-versa. In particular, your group’s chance of receiving the reward is  
(Your Group’s Minimum Bid)/(Minimum Bid in group A + Minimum Bid in group B) 
 If both group’s minimum bids are 0, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two groups. 
4) If your group receives the reward then in addition to the earnings from your individual account you receive 
the reward of 60 francs from your group account. A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, 
by increasing your contribution, you can increase your group’s chance of receiving the reward. 
5) The computer will assign the reward either to your group or to the other group, via a random draw. So, in 
each period, only one of the two groups can obtain the reward. 
 
Example: Random Draw and Earnings 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. Let’s say the 
members of groups A and B allocate their francs in the following way. 
 
Table 1 – Allocation of francs by all members in group A and B 
Group A 
If Group 
A 
receives 
reward 
Allocation  
to 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to group  
account 
 
Group B 
If Group 
B 
receives 
reward 
Allocation  
to 
individual 
account 
Allocation  
to group  
account 
Member 1 
Member 2 
Member 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
45 
50 
20 
15 
10 
 Member 1 
Member 2 
Member 3 
60 
60 
60 
59 
50 
55 
1 
10 
5 
 
In group A, member 1 contributes 20 francs, member 2 contributes 15 francs, and member 3 contributes 10 
francs to group A’s account. In group B, member 1 contributes 1 franc, member 2 contributes 10 francs, and 
member 3 contributes 5 francs to group B’ account. 
Then the computer chooses the lowest contribution in group A’s account and the lowest contribution in 
group B’s account. The two highest contributions in group A and the two highest contributions in group B will not 
be considered by the computer. In this example, member 3 has the lowest contribution of 10 francs in group A and 
member 1 has the lowest contribution of 1 franc in group B. For each franc of member 3 in group A the computer 
puts 1 red token into a bingo cage and for each franc of member 1 in group B the computer puts 1 blue token. 
Thus, the computer places 10 red tokens and 1 blue token into the bingo cage (11 tokens total). Then the computer 
randomly draws one token out of the bingo cage. If the drawn token is red group A receives the reward, if the token 
is blue group B receives the reward. You can see that since group A has more tokens it has a higher chance of 
receiving the reward (10 out of 11 times group A will receive the reward). Group B has a lower chance of receiving 
the reward (1 out of 11 times group B will receive the reward). 
 Let’s say the computer made a random draw and group A receives the reward. Thus, all the members of 
group A receive the reward of 60 francs from the group account plus they also receive earnings from the individual 
account. All members of group B receive earnings only from the individual account, since group B does not 
receive the reward. The calculation of the total earnings is shown in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 – Calculation of earning for all members in group A and B 
Group A 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total 
earnings 
 
Group B 
Earnings 
from 
group 
account 
Earnings 
from 
individual 
account 
Total 
earnings 
Member 1 
Member 2 
Member 3 
60 
60 
60 
40 
45 
50 
60+40 = 100 
60+45 = 105 
60+50 = 110 
 Member 1 
Member 2 
Member 3 
0 
0 
0 
59 
50 
55 
59 
50 
55 
 
At the end of each period, the total number of francs in the two groups’ accounts, group which receives the 
reward, earnings from individual and group accounts, and total earnings for the period are reported on the outcome 
screen as shown on the next page. Please record your results for the period on your record sheet under the 
appropriate heading. 
 
Outcome Screen 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of 
the first period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 3 people: group A or group B. You 
will remain in the same group for all 30 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of the first period, your group 
will be paired with another group. This pairing remains the same for all 30 periods of the experiment. Either group 
A or group B will receive a reward. The reward is 60 francs to each group member. A group can never guarantee 
itself the reward. However, by increasing your contribution, you can increase your group’s chance of receiving the 
reward. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment in Part 2 
using a bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment. 
